This tactical analysis breaks down the tactics of the match between Juventus and Sampdoria. With the use of match footage and data, this analysis unpacks what happened at Allianz Stadium in Juventus’s 3-0 win over Sampdoria. 

Lineups

A lot of new trends and faces for Juventus, beginning with the manager. After the firing of Maurizio Sarri in the summer, Andrea Pirlo was appointed as the boss of the bianconeri. Pirlo already brought a change in Juventus’s formation, turning it into a 3-5-2, which often assumed the shape of a 3-4-2-1 or 3-4-1-2 during this game.

In goal, Wojciech Szczęsny was confirmed. With Mathias de Ligt back out due to injury, Leonardo Bonucci, Giorgio Chiellini and Danilo were the three men in the back. The injury of Alex Sandro had Pirlo opt for Gianluca Frabotta on the left flank, while Juan Cuadrado lined up on the right side. Rodrigo Bentancur, who recorded the highest tally for assists in Juventus last season with seven, started on the bench alongside new signing from Barcelona, Arthur Melo. The two central midfielders were Adrien Rabiot and 22-year-old American Weston McKennie, on loan from Bundesliga side Schalke. Aaron Ramsey sat just in front of them with the freedom to roam. On top, Pirlo could count on neither the winner of the 2019/20 Serie A Best Player, Paulo Dybala, nor Federico Bernardeschi, both out with injuries. The winner of last season’s Best Young Player, Dejan Kulusevski, featured next to Cristiano Ronaldo. The two of them had 41 goals and 14 assists combined in the past campaign.

The guests initially opted for a different line-up than their usual 4-4-2, the formation that allowed them to collect several points during the final stretch of the last Serie A season. At Juventus Stadium, Ranieri employed a more cautious 4-5-1, with few changes from last season’s personnel. In front of goalkeeper Emil Audero, the backline of four were, from right to left, Bartosz Bereszyński, Omar Colley, Lorenzo Tonelli and Tommaso Augello. Fabio Depaoli played on the right-wing while the left flank featured Mehdi Léris. Sitting in the number six position was Albin Ekdal, with Jakub Jankto and Morten Thorsby next to him. Unable to count on Manolo Gabbiadini due to injury, Ranieri opted for Federico Bonazzoli as the lone striker. Veteran Fabio Quagliarella, the capocannoniere of the 2018/19 season, began on the bench.

Trends in Pirlo’s Juventus 

Juventus retained most of the ball possession, recording a dominant 65 percent. While keeping the ball, Pirlo’s men displayed several different ideas from those of last season under the management of Sarri.

In his recent dissertation for the UEFA Pro license, a document that was publicly released by Italian football governmental body “FIGC,” Pirlo explained how he wants his team to position in a 3-2-5 or 2-3-5 while in possession. From the early stages of the match, Juventus kept two players wide, one on each wing, with the job of occupying the entire width of the field.  In this match, this task was usually taken up by Frabotta and Cuadrado, as visible in the image below.

The line of five on top for Juventus, made of the two wingers and the three players in the so-called “rifinitura,” or “finishing area,” are visible below.

Keeping the wingers very wide allowed Juventus to quickly switch their play from one side to another, thus shifting the opponent’s defensive lines. Thanks to his abilities to deliver accurate long passes, Bonucci was often the player taking up the duty of switching the side of attack for the bianconeri. The picture below shows Bonucci finding Mattia De Sciglio wide open on the left side after Juventus have been moving the ball on the right. Notice how, as the ball is travelling, the blue jerseys are caught unprepared and now have to sprint to shift over and try closing down a wide-open De Sciglio.

The front two players in Juventus’s 3-5-2, Ronaldo and Kulusevski, were joined by one of the three central midfielders when Juventus were attacking. This player was usually Ramsay thanks to his tendency to make runs forward. Having three men next to each other in that part of the field is another concept of Pirlo’s coaching theory. In this “rifinitura” zone, Pirlo wants his most talented players to stay close to each other and unleash their creativity with combinations to goal. The pictures below show examples of Ronaldo, Kulusevski and Ramsey besides one another in that space.

This formation causes many bianconeri players to be found in the opponent’s half. This is why when Juventus lose possession, Pirlo wants his men to “defend while running forward.” In other words, his men are asked to apply quick pressure upon giving away the ball to force the opponent to make a mistake. If the ball is not won back in a timely fashion (Pirlo wrote about a five-second rule in his dissertation), the team drops and reorganizes its defensive structure.

Sampdoria’s approach 

In the first half, Sampdoria aimed to condense the space for Juventus’ front players by sitting on top of their box with nine of their 10 outfield players. These were often seen very close to one another, with only centre-forward Bonazzoli keeping a high position up the pitch.

Despite going down 1-0 in the 13th minute, keeping a compact block was key for Sampdoria to stay in the game as long as possible. In their 4-5-1 formation, which is well visible in the images below, great effort was especially required by wingers Depaoli and Leris to track back Juventus’s wing-backs, Frabotta and Cuadrado, respectively.

This cautious approach by the blucerchiati left centre-forward Bonazzoli dealing with two Juventus’s centre-backs, usually Bonucci and Chiellini. The picture below is a good summary of how deep Bonazzoli had to operate in the first half. Because his teammates were dropping back into their own half, Bonazzoli often looked isolated and too far from Juventus’s goal to be dangerous.

Offensively, Sampdoria tried to create numerical superiority on the flanks with their wingers and full-backs. The objective was to exploit those areas where Juventus had only one man and, from those spaces, deliver dangerous crosses or penetrate.

The Sampdoria players, however, lacked cleanliness on the ball when executing their offensive plays. The quality of their shots was, in fact, very low throughout the entire match. Out of 14 total shots, only one was on target. (It was a header by Augello that forced Szczęsny to make a great save.)

A more aggressive Sampdoria in the second half

Going into halftime, Sampdoria was still in the game, and Ranieri’s changes suggested he wanted his side to be more aggressive. He subbed off both his wingers, Depaoli and Leris, and reshaped the line-up into their typical 4-4-2. The introduction of Gaston Ramirez and Quagliarella in the second half added unpredictability to an attack that, despite having been much involved in their side’s defensive contribution, had been too sterile going forward.

The blucerchiati were able to bring bigger numbers into Juventus’ box in the second half.  This resulted in more opportunities being created, as visible in the difference in expected goals between the first and second 45 minutes of the match. In the first half, Sampdoria had a low 0.25 xG, while they were able to bring this figure up to 1.24 in the second half.

This more aggressive tendency, however, came at a cost. Sampdoria were more exposed to Juventus’s offensive quality and had to deal with situations in which their defenders were outnumbered against Juventus’ pacey players. The picture below shows Ramsey with a clear opportunity to engage the Sampdoria defensive line in a three-versus-two situation.

The Ronaldo factor 

Ronaldo was the most active player on the pitch offensively. He took nine shots, three of which were on goal. It is a figure even higher than last year’s average, when he led Serie A in shots per 90 minutes with 5.79.

His shots were not only consistent but also dangerous. On one of them, he hit the crossbar, while he forced goalkeeper Audero to make big saves on two other occasions. However, it was his continuous desire to attack the space behind Sampdoria’s defensive line that eventually earned him a goal in the 88th minute.

Throughout the entire game, Ronaldo would initiate his movement to attack the space when one of his teammates was facing forward with the ball at his feet. On the occasion of the goal, Ramsey had his head up and could therefore pick out Ronaldo with a through ball.

As we can see in the image below, Ronaldo’s body position invites the ball to be played into the space in front of him and behind Colley’s back. From there, Ronaldo then buries his chance with a shot across his body for the definitive 3-0

Conclusion 

Despite not being able to count on several starters like Dybala, De Ligt and Sandro, Juventus pulled off a convincing win against a Sampdoria side that put in a great defensive effort and stayed in the game until the last 10 minutes. Pirlo’s men were mobile, moved the ball quickly and showed good chemistry from the early stages of the game. Ranieri’s side stayed compact while out of possession but lacked offensive sharpness to bring real threats to Szczęsny’s goal: while Juventus had eight shots on target, Sampdoria had only one the whole match.

The new look of the bianconeri, with their 3-5-2 or 3-4-1-2, has the potential to bring exciting football to this Serie A campaign. Pirlo has also shown to not be afraid of giving responsibilities to young players, as shown by the fact that he started McKennie, Frabotta and Kulusevski. Next week, Juventus will face Roma away in what will be an early tough test for the bianconeri. Ranieri will probably go back to his trademarked 4-4-2 for Sampdoria’s next home match against newly-promoted side Benevento. As Gabbiadini keeps recovering from his inguinal injury (he should be back around mid-October), it will be a five-man battle for two spots up front between Bonazzoli, Quagliarella, Ramirez, Valerio Verre and the youngster Mikkel Damsgaard.

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Juventus, led by Maurizio Sarri, are coming off the back of a disappointing display and defeat against AC Milan, after a hot streak of form before that. In that game, they were missing a couple of their key players in the starting XI, namely Matthijs de Ligt and Paulo Dybala, but in that match, they alsseveral key errors defensively. Sarri’s tactics were not solid enough in that match-up as the defence had little to no cover from the midfield regardless. We will discover in this analysis if he altered this in any significant way.

Atalanta, manged by Gian Piero Gasperini, have also been in a rich reign of form since the resumption of Serie A football. Gasperini, who has a history with Juventus as a former youth graduate at the club, lost his most recent affair with them back in November, losing that game 3-1, which was during a period of struggle for the Nerazzuri. Atalanta are coming off the back of twelve consecutive victories in all competitions, scoring four or more in five of those fixtures. This analysis will take a deeper dive into this game, and how Juventus managed to put an end to this winning streak that Atalanta had put together.

Lineups

Juventus lined up in a 4-4-2 formation, which looked to utilise their strengths down the wings and participate in passing triangles which we have seen become a staple within Sarri’s tactics. They were fronted by Cristiano Ronaldo and Paulo Dybala as the two centre-forwards. Dybala’s return was welcome, and it was hoped that he would introduce a more present link between the midfield and attack. The wide-midfielders were Blaise Matuidi and Federico Bernardeschi, and by choosing Matuidi as a left-midfielder, Sarri was anticipating Papu Gómez to drift out towards the right wing, as he has done in recent matches, so the Frenchman was there to provide extra cover.

Regarding the midfield, Sarri went with Rodrigo Bentancur and Adrien Rabiot as the central midfield pivot, with Sarri hoping they would perform recoveries in the centre and progress the ball with their passing ability. The back four consisted of Danilo, Matthijs de Ligt, Leonardo Bonucci, and Juan Cuadrado, opting to bench Daniele Rugani following the return of de Ligt from suspension.  Wojciech Szczęsny kept his place as the goalkeeper.

Atalanta set out in a 3-4-1-2 formation which looked to utilise width in their attacks and went forward at a quicker tempo than they typically would. The two strikers were Josip Iličić and Duván Zapata and were accompanied by  Papu Gómez in the #10 role, with Iličić starting his first game since early March.

The wing-backs in this game were Timothy Castagne as left-wing-back and Hans Hateboer as the right-wing-back, with Robin Gosens missing out in this game, maybe because of speculation regarding his future at the club, and links to Inter Milan. The central midfield pivot was Remo Freuler and Marten de Roon, both capable in the transitional phase of play especially. The back three consisted of Berat Djimsiti, José Luis Palomino, and Rafael Tolói, with Pierluigi Gollini in between the sticks.

Juventus’ open-play concerns

Sarri’s side struggled to keep possession for a sustained period in this match, which is something they also struggled with in their last match against Milan. Particularly at the beginning of the game, they struggled to warm-up into the game and failed to create much of any significant value. They finished the first-half with an xG value of 0.24, which is not good enough for a side that sits at the top of the league.

In this game, whenever Juventus approached the final-third or made their way into the opposition’s box, they were pressed wide out of a goalscoring opportunity. Both of Juventus’ forwards visibly struggled to get into a goalscoring opportunity, due to the press that Atalanta deployed across the entire pitch. Additionally, both of Sarri’s starting wide-midfielders did not push up high enough often, and as a result, the forwards had a lack of support, which led to more direct long-balls played in the second half. Both Matuidi’s and Bernardeschi’s average positions in this game were in their own half, which is indicative of the roles they were given.

In the above analysis, we see Bentancur attempt a ranging pass into the path of Dybala in behind the Atalanta defence. Ronaldo is prepared to make run into the box for the cut-back, but other support from Juventus players is limited.

When Dybala brings the ball down, Palomino is in a favourable position to defend the ball. He is cutting off the angle that Dybala can shoot from, forcing him into a rushed decision. Simultaneously, Dybala has no options in support, with Ronaldo not approaching the attack with any urgency.

Just as in Juventus’ last match against Milan, their greatest chance from open-play was a result of a bright ball played over the top from Cuadrado into the path of Ronaldo. Be it a lack of confidence, poor coaching, or poor form, Sarri’s side were incapable of stringing together short passes to bypass pressure which was laid upon by Atalanta. This is what led to the likes of Cuadrado attempting more direct lofted passes. In this game, Cuadrado completed two deep completions, thirteen progressive passes, and five defensive duels to make for a good effort overall here.

Above, we can see Cuadrado notice the run of Ronaldo in behind the Atalanta defence. Two Atalanta players have clocked on at this point and are ready to run with Ronaldo and keep the pressure on him.

Ronaldo takes a touch and shifts the ball to the left and prepares to shoot on goal, but it is saved by Gollini. It is worth noting that if he were to have held up the ball, it would have made for a good goalscoring opportunity for Gonzalo Higuaín.

Both of Juventus’ goals were scored via two Ronaldo penalties in the second half. They were both given for handballs inside the box, and under the new handball rule, both penalties were lawfully awarded. Whether or not this rule is fair and justified is another debate well worthy of discussion. Ronaldo finished both penalties with aplomb, which takes him to eleven penalties converted out of eleven attempted this season, which can only be praised. What cannot and should not be praised, however, is Juventus’ open play efforts in this match as they were legitimately poor, struggling to create anything noteworthy, despite having the personnel capable enough.

Atalanta’s sundry talents

In the first half especially, Atalanta’s forward found it genuinely easy to work around the Juventus defence. We saw excellent hold-up play from the two centre-forwards, and even 5ft 4 Gómez was able of holding his man off in this match. Partially due to the extra defensive cover that Matuidi provided down Atalanta’s right-wing, Gasperini’s side favoured attacking down the left flank, with 45% of their attacks coming down that avenue. All three of Atalanta’s forwards combined well, despite how many Juventus players were back to provide defensive assurance.

Down the left wing, Zapata and Gómez would drift towards these areas and drag the attention of the Juventus defence. Off the left, they would cut inside and look to find space inside the opponent’s box and take a shot from a favourable angle. In this game, they focused less on individual talent, and more upon how they could work more effectively as an attacking unit, and it worked in periods here.

After a recovery by Atalanta, Gómez occupies the ball and begins to dribble with the ball. Zapata is in support, keen to receive the ball into his feet.

After a one-two is completed between the two forwards, Gómez holds up the ball and drags de Ligt off his defensive line. This creates space for Zapata to run into, to hold off Bentancur, and finish the ball into the bottom right corner.

As has been the case for much of the post-lockdown football that Atalanta have played, they were not at their fantastic best, but they did enough to get a decent result. Realistically, they deserved much more from the game, given the penalty decisions which went against them were unfortunate, to say the least. Nonetheless, football is often a game of luck and on this day, they did not get the rub of green required to establish the victory.

First-rate Ruslan Malinovskiy

Ruslan Malinovskiy was introduced in the 68^th minute of this tie and injected a sense of urgency and much-needed dynamism to Atalanta’s midfield, as he has demonstrated numerous times this season. His final-third threat has been a useful asset for Atalanta this season, whenever their forwards have lacked the direction necessary to drive a game in their favour (which admittedly is not often). He has looked bright throughout this season, as seen by his 0.3 xA, 3.34 successful dribbles (72.1% success rate), and 6.23 successful pressures per 90 to make for what seems to be a complete midfielder.

In this game, the focus was placed upon breaking the deadlock at the time and giving his side the advantage via taking shots of his own. Taking the game into his own hands, he completed three dribbles, took three shots, and had two touches in the penalty area, which was second in the Atalanta squad for this game. He looked to receive the ball directly into his feet and drive down the centre of the Juventus defence from there.

In the above analysis, we see Malinovskiy in a lot of space, asking for the ball to come to his feet. Luis Muriel takes it around Rabiot and plays the ball into the path of the Ukrainian.

He drives into the Juventus box and hits the ball with such venom, that Szczęsny had little to no chance of saving it. The ball whizzed past the Pole’s left side and into the net.

Conclusion

Ultimately, Atalanta put in the better performance in this game, but they were considered unlucky to concede the two penalties they did. Largely due to the two penalties, xG had this game 2.00 to 1.44 in Juventus’ favour.

Sarri should be aware that Atalanta are an elite side in Serie A, and therefore his team’s performance can be dictated by that fact, but otherwise, this was a wholly poor performance. While his team play this 4-4-2 formation, they have struggled to keep possession in the centre of the park, seemingly outrun in most occasions. Sarri’s team selection was also puzzling, with Matuidi as left-midfielder going down as a risk which was not worth taking.

Gasperini can take solace from the fact that his side were comfortably better than the top of the table Juventus. His starting XI did a good job of combining and creating decent chances, while his choice of substitutes did a good job of bringing the game to Juventus. Though they did not create the chances at the volume they are used to, they were up against a side who are typically rigid defensively and less flexible than the standard Serie A defence.

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Juventus enter two intense weeks, as they have to battle Milan, Atalanta, Sassuolo, and Lazio in the next four matches. The following seven days will be decisive for Sarri’s side to keep their distance from second-placed Lazio and march on toward their ninth Scudetto in the last nine years.

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Kick-off at 4:15pm UK time (11:15am EST).

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Through an analysis of his performances this season, we will discover how he has adapted his style of play from the fast-paced nature of La Liga, to the slower and more considered nature of Serie A football. His first season, under coach Massimiliano Allegri, saw tactics that were arguably more suitable to Ronaldo than what we are currently viewing under Maurizio Sarri. Generally, we have seen Ronaldo occupy more time on the ball in his second season in Turin, becoming more involved in the build-up play. This scout report will detail what changes have been made in this regard, and whether this has benefitted Ronaldo’s contribution or not.

In this tactical analysis, we will examine Ronaldo’s performance across the 2019/20 season, how his role has changed, where he has struggled in Italy, and where he still excels.

Style of play

The Portuguese legend has played primarily as centre-forward this season, with some time spent on the left-wing as well. In either position, he still likes to run down the left-wing with the ball attached to his foot and cut inside to release a venomous strike on goal. In these scenarios, he opts to hit the ball with power, rather than placement.

His status within the game affects how his teammates view him, he is certainly one of the leaders in the dressing room and that is clear to see on the pitch as well. Since arriving at Juventus, he seems to have improved his aerial ability, as has been well documented by the media. He can leap and tower above any defender in the world it seems, which he has used to his advantage numerous times this campaign. As he likes to be the man on the end of an attacking play, he often likes to initiate a one-two with his attacking partner, whether that be Paulo Dybala, Gonzalo Higuaín, or whoever else is up top with him.

This season, Juventus tend to hold the ball in the opposition’s half for large periods of the game, with rotations regularly played between the two centre-backs and whoever plays as the #6. They are a side who do not look to aggressively press their opponent’s, instead, they look to cut off their passing lanes to regain possession and build their attack. Sarri has favoured a diamond midfield this season with his 4-1-2-1-2 formation or sometimes reverting to his renowned 4-3-3 formation, either of which suit Ronaldo well enough. Juventus like to attack down the middle of pitch through the use of attacking triangles we have seen Sarri’s sides operate numerous times over the last half-decade.

Passing and build-up

Juventus play their football with a possession focus in the build-up, looking towards the #6 (usually Miralem Pjanić) to dictate the tempo. They irregularly attack down the wings and prefer to find room down the half-space for one of their forwards to operate and create chances through their own individual skill. Sarri lays heavy emphasis upon possession, but sometimes at the cost of chance creation as they keep possession of the ball for large periods of the match without attempting any form of attacking venture. Unless they are in the final third, they opt to play the short pass, and as such, they have the highest pass accuracy in Serie A, with all their players finding their man 87.8% of the time on average.

Ronaldo looks to receive the ball to feet as much as possible. Occasionally, he will look to make a run in behind the opposition’s defence, usually when Juventus are on the counterattack. Consistently, Ronaldo will drop deeper to receive the ball directly, and then he will either look to dribble down the left-wing and cut inside, or he will attempt to do layoffs with his fellow forwards to create an opportunity for himself. When he wants to dribble with the ball, it is sometimes born out of frustration of his side struggling to create an opportunity on goal.

Above, we can see his heatmap this season.

He likes to be the end of most of Juventus’ attacks. He likes to be the man in the dangerous positions to release a shot on goal. As mentioned, when frustrated with the lack of chance creation, he will drop deep to receive a pass and forge an opportunity of his own. He will take on his opponents with his iconic step-over approach and look to dash past them and closer towards goal. Consequently, we understand that he is dribbling from deeper than he did in his later Real Madrid days, as can be seen, his average numbers of players he dribbles past per 90, which has increased from 1.26 in 2017/18 (his last season in Madrid) to 1.90 in 2019/20.

In the above analysis, we can see Ronaldo come deeper to receive the ball to feet.

Further forward, we see Ronaldo dribble past the defensive midfielder and step-over his way to take a shot on goal from the edge of the box.

Impact on their final third approach and attacking contribution

As mentioned, the team’s 4-1-2-1-2 and 4-3-3 formations suit Ronaldo in different ways. He has performed best when used as a striker this season, where he can provide an elite attacking contribution.

In his two seasons at Juventus, we have seen his goal output drop from the alien numbers he was producing at Real Madrid. Although, the amount he has scored this season is still within an elite bracket. In this scout report, we are mainly judging his ability from open-play to the team. This season, he has taken a higher proportion of penalty kicks than usual, attempting one every three games, while last season he was attempting roughly one every five matches. We have subsequently seen his non-penalty xG (npxG) per 90 drop every season from 2017/18 to 2019/20, going from 0.81 to 0.50 in the current Serie A season.

Here, we see Ronaldo out on the left-wing, with a couple passing avenues he could take. In this scenario, Dybala is more able in a central area to take on his opponent’s.

Nonetheless, Ronaldo decides taking a shot would be the best option in this scenario and it is easily saved by the keeper.

This all adds to his diminishing finishing ability, as seen by his npxG per shot of 0.09, down from his final season in Spain which stood at 0.12.

He has, however, become more creative than his later years at Real Madrid, where he almost solely focused on taking shots. This is in association to spending more time with the ball at his feet than he did in the latter stages of his career in Madrid. As he is coming deeper to receive the ball, by default, he has more space in front of him to release a through ball or direct pass to a teammate. It was mentioned earlier that too often he decides to shoot, instead of exploring other attacking avenues, but he is still passing more in the final-third than he has done in the past. His passes into the final third per 90 have increased from 1.3 in 2017/18 to 1.9 in 2019/20, which backs up what we can see on the pitch.

In the above analysis, we can see the high press of Inter has pushed Ronaldo back into his half. He backs into the defender who is applying pressure.

Here, we see Ronaldo play a one-two with Higuaín, where the Argentinian makes a run down the half-space, for Ronaldo to make a pass which takes bypasses Inter’s high press.

One element of Ronaldo’s game which has not changed much at all is his defensive contribution. It is useful for Sarri to play Dybala or Costa upfront with Ronaldo as they will use their energy to press their opponents with far more urgency than the 35-year-old. While Ronaldo applies pressure to an opponent on the ball just 8.19 times per 90, Dybala applies pressure more than double that, at 17.3 times per 90.

Above, we can see the locations and outcomes of his recoveries. Notice how most of which are down the left-wing, leading to the side regaining possession but not creating a chance.

Conclusion

We have now looked at the important aspects of Ronaldo’s game, and how they have changed from his time in the capital of Spain. Has he been worth the €100m they paid for him? One may argue no, as Juventus have not claimed the Champions League title they so desperately want and they did not need his services to win Serie A, besides his mammoth wages. Others may disagree, noting that he has still produced elite attacking output, adding to the reputation his signature brings (new long-term fans, shirt sales, etc.). The trend that is clear to see is that Ronaldo is becoming a weaker finisher, with his shot locations becoming more worrying as the seasons go on. Though his goal-scoring numbers are still top-notch and he provides added value through his dribbling and chance creation as well.

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Daniele Rugani arrived at Juventus from Empoli in 2015. He helped Empoli gain promotion to the Serie A in the 2014-15 season, off the back of a strong 2013-2014 season which saw him win Serie B Footballer of the Year. It must be noted that Rugani has played only three games for Juventus this season. The scout report therefore is a tactical analysis based on all of the games he played for Juventus in the 2018/19 season.

Line-up

Rugani has played as the right of two centre-backs in most of the games he’s played for Juventus. However, he is almost as competent playing on the left as he has often played both positions in the same game. Take for instance the below starting line-up from the game Juventus vs Verona.

The below heat-map indicates the ground covered by Rugani for Juventus in the 2018/19 season. His preference to stay on the right side of the pitch is also evident from his season heat-map so far. Equally evident is his presence as the left of two centre-backs.

Daniele Rugani – A deep dive

As previously noted, it would be insignificant to compare his numbers with the other Juve defenders who’ve played for Juventus this season. While the scout report cannot conclusively state who’s better than whom, it can certainly give an indication of Rugani’s style of play compared to the other defenders. The analysis considers 2019/20 stats for all of Juventus’ remaining centre-back options – Matthijs de Ligt, Merih Demiral & Leonardo Bonucci. Since Giorgio Chiellini is out with a long-standing injury, we do not consider his stats for the analysis.

Defensive ability

From a purely defensive skill stand-point, the analysis considers numbers for duels, interceptions per 90 and shots blocked per 90.

Per number of defensive duels per 90, there’s nobody statistically better than Demiral. A defensive duel is when the player was involved in a duel with an opponent player who was in possession of the ball at the time of the duel. The chart indicates that although Rugani has been involved in the second most number of defensive duels per 90 (5.23), his ability to win duels puts him down. He wins only 57.96% of the duels that he is involved in. In other words, while he does show the intent to get involved in duels, he lacks the ability to win the duel and steal the ball from the opposing player.

A similar trend is observed in the aerial duels per 90 as well.

Demiral has been involved in the most aerial duels per 90 (5.78) and also the most effective in winning the ball in that duel (76.2%). Rugani is the least involved in aerial duels, with 3.42 duels per 90 at a winning rate of 67.4%. Both Rugani and Demiral stand at 190 m tall. Given his tall frame, you’d expect Rugani to be more involved in aerial duels.

The above analysis indicates the fact that Rugani is maybe not as good as a Demiral, de Ligt or Bonucci. It its a maybe, because both sets of data belong to different seasons. However, it can definitely indicate a style of play for Rugani. And the style of play highlights his inability to match the fellow centre-backs defensively.

For the next bit of defensive analysis, we will try to understand the positional awareness of the players. For this analysis, we consider interceptions per 90, and the shots blocked per 90. Interceptions are useful in determining how good a player is at reading the game and anticipating the next move. Cutting off a passing lane by good positional awareness and intercepting a pass helps breakdown play and start a counter-attack. Shots blocked requires a combination of fine positional awareness and a willingness to put their body in the line for sake of their team.

De Ligt records the highest number of interceptions at 5.2 per 90. Rugani records similar number of interceptions per 90 as Bonucci at 4.31. Demiral, in comparison makes 3.3 per 90. However, Rugani blocks the most shots per 90 along with De Ligt at 0.76. His numbers for both interceptions and shots blocked are a consequence of his ability to read the game well, his anticipatory skills, and superior positional awareness.

From a purely defensive stand-point, what Rugani lacks in duels, he makes up with his good positional sense. A stark contrast to Demiral, who aces the duels but lacks Rugani’s positional awareness. De Ligt is more than competitive on all fronts, while Bonucci is seemingly weak in defensive stats apart from interceptions. Can Rugani start games over his fellow centre-backs based purely on defensive output? Maybe not. Demiral and De Ligt are arguably better defensively. Can he be a good defensive back-up? Possibly, yes. An analysis of other facets of his game can help answer this better.

Ball progression

Modern day tactics expect a centre-back to be able to play the ball out of trouble, initiate counter-attacks, and drive the distribution from the back. As such, the scout report now looks at Daniele Rugani’s ability with the ball at his feet. The tactical analysis looks at the stats for his passing ability and dribbling ability.

Centre-backs hardly engage in dribbles when compared to full-backs and wing-backs. The same holds true in this case as well.  However, it is worth noting that among the four centre-backs in question, Rugani makes the second most dribbles per 90 (0.31) behind Bonucci (0.34). He enjoys a far greater success rate of 83.33% compared to Bonucci’s 66.67%. While that may not seem much in the larger scheme of things, it is an indicator of his comfort on the ball when compared to De Ligt and Demiral.

The above chart shows that among the four defenders in this analysis, Rugani made the least number of passes per 90 (45.48). However, he has the second best passing accuracy of the lot (91.71%). Below are the numbers for all the Juventus centre-backs.

While this indicates his ability to not be wayward with passes and keep possession with the team, it doesn’t tell us the type of the passes played. It is important to understand the type of passes a defender makes, and the impact the pass has on the build-up play. For this, we further split Rugani’s passes into three – forward passes, backward passes and lateral passes.

Rugani makes the second most forward passes per 90, among the centre-backs, after Bonucci. 43% of the 45.48 passes that Rugani plays per 90, i.e. 18.06, are forward passes. These passes indicate the intent of the player to move the ball forward, instead of making a lateral pass which is less risky but doesn’t add much to the attacking build-up. This could be due to one of two reasons – either it is a part of the tactics, and he is played alongside a player who is more conservative with his passes. Alternatively, it could also be his natural style of play, to move the ball forward and attack. In either case, the fact remains that he is more likely to move the ball forward, much like Bonucci; while De Ligt & Demiral prefer to play lateral, less risky passes.

Progressive passes can be defined as a considerably long forward pass with – a pass length of 30m if both starting and ending points are in the same half, 15m is both points are different halves, and 10m if both points are in the opponents half. The above image tries to bring out how attack minded the players are, when playing out from the back. Bonucci leads the pack by a mile. He makes the most forward passes per 90 (25.7) and the most progressive passes per 90 (12.51). Rugani comes in second on both with 18.06 forward passes and 7.54 progressive passes. Rugani is closely followed by De Ligt and Demiral.

Below is an instance from the game Sampdoria vs Juventus from 2018/19 season. Rugani had an option to play a short pass but instead went for a forward long ball. This indicates his willingness to play an attacking ball forward instead of playing a more conservative lateral pass.

Another instance of similar play is from the game Juventus vs Fiorentina from the 2018/19 season. Yet again, Rugani had at least three options to play a short pass, but instead chose to play a quick forward ball to Cristiano Ronaldo in the other half. Ronaldo used the pace of the ball and pivoted it into the path of the oncoming Blaise Matuidi.

The play transitioned from defence to attack in 5 seconds! An attack that was kick-started by Rugani’s smart long pass.

Even in the above analysis, Bonucci leads the pack. He makes the most passes into the final third per 90 (9.53). Rugani follows with 5.11, followed by De Ligt and Demiral. This further indicates Rugani’s intent of getting the ball forward. So far from the analysis, we have learnt that Rugani prefers to play progressive forward attack minded passes, over the short lateral possession minded passes. His numbers for final third passes also indicate that he doesn’t hold back from putting the long ball in either. And all of this at a healthy accuracy rate of 91%.

Below is an instance from the Ajax vs Juventus game. Despite being under pressure, Rugani chooses to pay the ball higher up the pitch in order to unlock the defence. The intent was to put the ball over the midfield and defence, straight into the path of Ronaldo who would break the off-side trap and get in behind the defence. Unfortunately though, Ronaldo overruns the ball. However, the intent was spot on.

Another such instance was from the game Genoa vs Juventus. Rugani has three options to play a conservative short pass, but instead opts to play a long aerial pass to Mario Mandžukić. Again, the intent being to put the ball over the midfield and defence, into the final third, and start an attack.

To further understand the kind of passes played by Rugani, we look at the average length of the pass made.

Rugani’s average pass length stands at 20.21 meters, which is lower than both the fellow centre-backs – Bonucci (22.69m) and De Ligt (20.95m). But when this data is looked at alongside numbers for final third passes per 90, it shows that despite making marginally shorter passes than De Ligt, Rugani makes more deep completions. All of the stats put together i.e. average length of pass, coupled with his high percentage of forward passes, ball comfort, and high progressive passes & final third passes indicate that he is an attack minded passer who prefers to move the ball forward rather than laterally. It indicates that he prefers making riskier, forward, progressive attacking passes rather than less risky, short, lateral, possession-keeping passes.

In all of the ball playing ability charts, one observation is constant – Rugani is second on the list for attack contributions among centre-backs. Rugani has the second most number of progressive passes per 90 (7.54) at an accuracy of 79.34%. He is only led by Bonucci who makes 12.51 progressive passes per 90 at an accuracy of 84%. Bonucci also has the highest number of passes to the final third per 90 (9.53) followed by Rugani who makes 5.11. Rugani is second on the list of forward passes with 18.06 per 90, and has the least number of lateral passes per 90 (21.24).

The tactical analysis has established that Rugani is a capable defender, owing to his good positional awareness. He’s a good passer of the ball and a good contributor to the attacking build-up play. The analysis so far, has also indicated that he isn’t afraid to take make risky passes, and plays attacking forward passes in the game. In today’s game, newer tactics have often had centre-backs play the long balls into the attacking third, to catch the opponent off-guard or to simply execute a quick counter-attack. Rugani, has been more than capable on that front as well.

What’s next?

The scout report brings out the style of play Rugani adopts, his strengths and his areas of improvement. The tactical analysis highlights his competitive defensive ability owing to his positional awareness. However, he does lack the ability to win duels defensively, which puts his ability in question compared to De Ligt, Demiral and Bonucci. In transition, he prefers to play attacking forward passes, to contribute to the team attacks and move the ball forward. His passing accuracy also highlights his ability to successfully execute a pass. As is evident in the number of final third passes and progressive passes, he is a skilled contributor to the attack play. While his ball playing ability is to be hailed, his defensive attributes don’t quite guarantee a starting spot over De Ligt & Demiral. Sure, he could be a good back-up option for the ageing Bonucci, but with sub-par defensive stats, it does seem like Juventus would go for somebody else in the transfer window to replace Bonucci. As for Rugani, he could choose to remain a substitute in the squad, or look for more play time to better his skill.

Juventus have won titles on the back of a strong showing from their defence. Although, they have looked leaky defensively this season, something that is completely out of character for them. For the first time in five years, they are led by a team (Lazio) on the list of fewest goals conceded. They have already conceded more goals per game 0.92 than in any of their previous four seasons: 2018/19 – 0.82, 2017/18 – 0.72, 2016/17 – 0.74 and 2015/16 – 0.62. Given Juventus’ philosophy of a solid defence, they need Merih Demiral & De Ligt, both have top stats defensively. Bonucci’s superior attacking contribution mean he is also above Rugani in the pecking order. Rugani either has to get closer to Bonucci in terms of attacking contributions, or closer to Demiral and De Ligt in terms of defensive contributions. Currently, he’s in the middle of them both, meaning he doesn’t necessarily bring in a specialised skill. He can fill in for both, or in other words – he can play a good substitute for both roles.

Conclusion

While the scout report cannot conclusively say who’s better of the Juventus centre-backs, it has provided an insight into the style of play adopted by Rugani. Defensively, Rugani is a good back-up option for Juventus to have. His positional awareness, reading of the game and ability to break-down the path of a pass, is commendable. His numbers for interceptions and shots blocked are of the same high standard. The tactical analysis reveals that Rugani prefers to play attacking passes with the intent moving the ball forward. He is somewhere between the attacking mindedness of Bonucci, and the defensive solidarity of Demiral and De Ligt. He’s going to have to get closer to either side of the spectrum to truly start challenging for a starting role. At 25, you’d expect him to start playing regularly given the potential he has shown in his early years. He can either fight for this at Juventus, or elsewhere given a host of clubs such as Arsenal, Manchester United and A.S Roma were linked with him just last summer.

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This is the case of Nicolo Fagioli, Juventus’ offensive midfielder who, until the stop caused by the coronavirus, was dividing successfully between the Primavera team and the Juventus Under 23 squad, plus with some training and first-team appearances to testify his exponential growth.

The most significant turning point in his young career came in 2015 when Juventus, bewitched by its characteristics, bought the playmaker and for him, the way of experiencing football changed completely.  In recent years, in fact, he has been called up for Italy Under 17 and Under 19 and takes part in some great competitions such as the 2018 European Under 17. In the meanwhile, Fagioli is 19 years old and might be a very interesting player for Juventus´first team next season.

This tactical analysis will provide you with Fagioli’s role in the tactics of Juventus´ U23 and U19 team. Furthermore, this scout report will show you why Fagioli is an interesting prospect for Juve’s first team.

Role in the system

For Juve’s U23, Fagioli played five times this season. In each of these matches, he played as a central midfielder in front of the defensive line within a double pivot as the team is lined up in a 4-2-3-1 formation.

In his regular squad, the U19 in Primavera, Fagioli played 14 out of 17 possible matches. Head coach Lamberto Zauli lines up his team in a 4-3-1-2 formation. Therefore, Fagioli is used as a holding midfielder or as central offensive midfielder behind two out-and-out strikers. As you will see in this analysis, he likes to play in a free attacking role granted the freedom to roam the pitch and find space.

So, the young Italian is an offensive allrounder capable of playing in various positions in midfield. Regardless as he plays in a more defensive or offensive role, he can be found everywhere on the pitch as he covers lots of space within the midfield area and the half-spaces. As he is used to playing more on the left side in the U23´s 4-2-3-1 he is more active within the left half-space. The heatmap below indicates that movement.

Build-up play

Especially playing as a central defensive midfielder, Fagioli has to help with the build-up play. To do so, he drops deep between the opposition´s defensive and midfield line. His vision for free pockets of space is extraordinarily good as you will see in the following sections of this scout report. In the build-up play, he uses this vision to get out of already blocked passing lanes. When he receives the ball, he has lots of space to turn and lots of time to find an efficient passing option. So, his great vision and his passing ability help him orchestrating or providing dynamism to the team’s build-up process with ease and effectiveness.

In the following image, Fagioli drops deep between the Inter’s defensive and midfield line. He can use lots of free space once he received the ball. Adding to that, he only has to beat the opposition’s defensive line as their midfield line is already outplayed.

Another example from the match against Inter. Again, Fagioli finds a pocket of space behind the opposition´s midfield line. By passing the ball into this space, Juve´s centre-back can break Inter´s offensive and midfield line.

The same procedure is used by Fagioli in the next image. This time, he is in an even more advanced position on the pitch and can directly set up one of Juventus´ forwards after receiving the ball. Therefore, he can use lots of space and time to find the perfect solution.

One-two passes

One of Fagioli’s key movement concerning his playing style is one-two passes. After receiving the ball from the defence, he is responsible to find an excellent passing option to continue with the attack. That is why he often uses one-two passes. By doing so, he can save time and he can look for a free space in an advanced position on the pitch to receive the ball there. Furthermore, he and his teammate can outplay several opponents with two short passes. These short passes might be a reason for his high rate (81,7%) of successful passes.

Most of the time, Fagioli plays these passes with one of the fullbacks as you can see in the following examples. In the first situation, Fagioli plays out wide to Juventus´ right-back and immediately starts a run into a more advanced position. That is why his teammate can pass the ball back to Fagioli with just one touch. The opponent has no chance to recover possession.

In the next situation, Fagioli plays the ball out wide to the left-back once again. But, this time he has to run through two opponents.

However, Juventus´ full-back has lots of time and space to find the perfect moment to play a pass back to Fagioli.

Off-the-ball movement

Fagioli demonstrates his intelligence and cleverness at his off-the-ball movements. Similar to his movement during the build-up play and the one-two-passes with his teammates, Fagioli is always looking for a free pocket of space. He moves smart and often delivers perfect-timed surging runs into free space in dangerous areas.

In the image below, Juve´s left-back is in possession looking for a teammate to pass the ball to. At the same time, Fagioli is starting a run into the opposition´s box providing an excellent passing option. By receiving the pass, Fagioli can use lots of free space in a dangerous area having a goal-scoring opportunity.

In the image below, Juventus have possession in a more central area on the pitch. Fagioli makes a run in behind the defensive line to receive a through ball free in front of the goal. It is no real challenge for him to score another goal from that position.

Of course, Fagioli is practising his off-the-ball movement in the own half as well. By doing so, he can provide a passing option helping his teammates to break the opponents´ pressing. In the image below, Juventus´ left-back gets pressed by the opponents. Fagioli recognizes this situation, reacts quickly, and starts another run into free space to provide a passing option.

Initiator

Helping with the build-up play and being a passing option during the whole match, the creative playmaker initiates nearly every attack for his team. In fact, he plays the most passes in the Primavera team. Down below you can see a map of his progressive passes which is also including progressive runs. The number of progressive passes is remarkably high.

The midfielder, who sees the game differently from most revealing creativity, uses the long-range pass very often. This type of passes requires an exceptionally good touch as well as particularly good timing. Because of his brilliant technique, it seems to be not that difficult to play these long-range passes on regularly base. Most of these passes, Fagioli creates from the half-spaces as this is the area he is used playing in most.

The following pass from the match against Genoa provides an example. Fagioli recognizes a smart movement by one of his teammates. Because of his passing ability, he is able to set up his teammate in a very dangerous area in front of the opposition´s goal.

In the last example above, Fagioli was playing a long-range pass which not only led to a dangerous goal-scoring opportunity but also switched the point of the attack onto the other side of the pitch. Even if this is the most used method by the young Italian, he is also able to play these passes from a central position in behind the back of the opposition´s defensive line.

The two images below provide you with examples of those long balls from the match against Cagliari. Here, Fagioli is positioned in the centre at the midfield-line. Juventus´ forward starts a run in behind the opposition´s defence waiting for a well-timed pass of Fagioli.

In the next image, Fagioli is in a more advanced position on the pitch. Nevertheless, he is still at the centre looking for a long-range pass in behind the defence. He waits until one forward starts the usual movement so that he can play that pass.

This method of quickly played and perfect-timed long balls can be very efficient against both high-standing and deep-lying teams. In fact, most of his deliveries into dangerous areas are made with those long balls as you can see in the map down below.

Through balls

But, he cannot use this method during the whole match. Especially in counterattacks, Fagioli prefers to play short and flat interface passes in behind the opposition´s defensive line. In general, the youngster is extremely dangerous on the counter thanks to his pace and accelerations. These attributes combined with his vision and passing ability make it even more difficult to defend a counterattack of the Juve team.

In the following image, Fagioli plays an interface ball between the opposition´s centre-back and full-back to set up Juventus´ right-wing.

The image below is a blueprint for this kind of interface pass as Fagioli is breaking the midfield line at the same time. This pass is even more difficult as he is within the same vertical channel as Juventus´ forward.

The next image provides you with an example of a through ball between the opposition´s centre-backs during a counter-attack. This shows that even in high speed, Fagioli still has a good overview and an extremely good touch to set up a better-positioned teammate.

Furthermore, Fagioli has a brilliant technique and composure in tight spaces. This leads to the fact that he does not fear the individual duels. He usually creates danger or suffers a foul because it is not easy to tackle the ball away from him.

In the next image, the midfielder uses this ability to attract three defenders and he goes into dribbling with his good ball control.

After that, he has the vision and the passing ability to play another perfect-timed through pass to his teammate who starts a run into a dangerous area within the penalty box.

A prove for the fact that lots of these passes from outside the penalty box are key passes providing a goal-scoring opportunity is the following map of his penalty area deliveries. In general, Fagioli contributes a goal in nearly every second match with 0,2 goals per 90 minutes and 0,2 assists per 90 minutes (0,4 goal contributions per 90 minutes). Here, it is important to mention that he uses his goal-scoring opportunities cold-blooded as his xG is 0.2.

Lack of consistency

As every other young player Fagioli has an area to improve as well. Even if he is a nearly perfect player, his constancy issues could cost him a place in Juventus´ first-team squad. In the pictures below, you can see some concentration difficulties losing the ball because of bad ball control or a bad pass.

In the following image, Fagioli receives a pass from his teammate. Due to concentration difficulties, he cannot trap the ball. Genoa´s forward can pick up the ball and is already in a good position to create a goal-scoring opportunity.

In the image below, Fagioli tries to set up Juve´s right-wing. However, his pass is to slightly and the defender has no problem to intercept the counterattack. Losing the ball in a progressive movement during a counterattack can get very expansive if the opponents can react quickly enough.

Even worst is the next failed pass by Fagioli as Juve has possession near their own penalty box. Fagioli tries to play a pass through two opponents which failed. If Cagliari´s forwards react good enough it should be an easy way to score a goal.

This inattentiveness leads to lots of ball losses. These could have an opponent´s goal as a consequence, especially if Fagioli loses the ball in a dangerous area within Juve´s own half. The map of Fagioli´s ball losses indicates that most of his inaccurate passes or lost duels are made in the opponent´s half. Nevertheless, there are still too many losses in Juventus´ own half.

Especially on such a high level in Serie A and in a team like Juventus, where no mistakes should be done, this lack of consistency could cost him a place in the first-team squad next season. That is why he still has a margin for improvements. But, this is a process which will improve with increased experience and playing time in matches on a high level.

Conclusion

Playing against professionals in Serie C gives Fagioli the chance to compete with more experienced opponents, even if the quality is higher in youth tournaments. Surely, the playmaker from Piacenza grows exponentially dividing himself between two teams and thanks also to the appearances with the first team. In addition to training with champions such as Cristiano Ronaldo, Paulo Dybala, Giorgio Chiellini and many others, Fagioli took part in the 2-0 International Champions Cup game against Bayern Munich, a great experience that gave him the opportunity to compete against world-class players.

The career of this youngster is certainly proceeding in an excellent way, with a series of events that have helped to make him popular at a young level and that, above all, are making him grow on a human and technical level. The health emergency has stopped an incredibly positive season for him and his Primavera team, currently fourth in the standings, and we all hope that we can soon return to normal.

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